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On the Regional Rootedness of Population Mobility and 
Environmental Change
Felicitas Hillmann, Ernst Spaan
Abstract: This article argues that the interplay of changing environmental condi-
tions in the wake of climate change and dynamic migration systems will lead to even 
more clearly articulated new regional formations. The way regions perceive the risks 
of climate change, how they cope with and adapt to these risks and their constitu-
tion as resilient entities determines the way migration and mobility take place. We 
focus on the regional dimensions of climate change and broader related develop-
mental trends such as urbanisation and will highlight this nexus for coastal regions. 
We present two regional case studies, Keta in Ghana and Semarang in Indonesia. 
Both cities have experienced fl oods and related environmental risks throughout 
their histories. The contrasting analysis of the two cases illustrates that similar en-
vironmental challenges may have very different effects on the migratory patterns.
Keywords: Migration · Environmental Change · Region · Development · Diaspora
1 Introduction 
In the past years, a notable increase in research on the relationship between climate 
change and population redistribution, i.e. migration, has occurred. The academic 
debate is multifaceted, it links to two mega trends: fi rst, the exacerbation of envi-
ronmental degradation through climate change; and second, population dynamics 
and migratory movements. The two debates cover somewhat different fi elds of 
knowledge: while the analysis of and the argumentation on environmental change 
is mainly tied to the natural sciences and mostly relies on quantitative data, the 
analysis of population dynamics and migration is deeply embedded in the social 
sciences and makes use of both quantitative and qualitative data. Currently, these 
two fi elds show similar diffi culties when it comes to defi nitions concerning the di-
mensions of the phenomenon (How many people? How much environmental degra-
dation?) and its temporalities (Permanent or temporary movements? Rapid or slow 
environmental change?). The key concepts are generally employed in an imprecise 
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manner. Global observations are taken into account at times, sometimes quoting 
estimates of how much migration will be caused by various degrees of sea-level 
rise. There is also a large body of literature using case studies to illustrate specifi c 
local situations. Many regions experience environmental degradation, but show 
very different capacities to cope with the changes. Migration is among the most 
relevant adaptation strategies and is thus in the core of our analysis.
This article frames environmental change and processes of population mobility 
in a dynamic perspective by emphasizing the importance of the existing regional 
settings and trends. Rather than viewing climate change as a global phenomenon 
resulting in a variety of local consequences including population mobility, we ar-
gue for a perspective that interprets migration and environmental change as two 
separate processes that intersect under certain circumstances and at certain points 
in time. We favour a regional analysis that accentuates the man-made dimension 
of environmental change by linking ongoing socio-economic transformation pro-
cesses such as rapid urbanisation to longstanding population dynamics. As this 
article shows, rapid-onset events such as frequent fl ooding may result in migration 
in some places, but not in others. Except for resettlement due to acute crises, mi-
gration propensity and patterns are fi rmly tied to the regional economic and socio-
cultural context. 
This article focuses on the situation in coastal regions, which are generally 
among the most vulnerable to climate change. Coastlines are also known to be con-
ducive to highly dynamic population movement and economic development, both 
due to linking the hinterland to the coast and as an access point for international 
socio-economic circuits. This article uses a comparative perspective. It contrasts 
two cities that experienced fl ooding for many years. The empirical data presented 
in this article is drawn from a larger research project carried out between 2014 and 
2016 (see footnotes 1, 4 and 9 for more detail on methodology).1
In the fi rst section, this article presents an overview of the state of the debate on 
climate change and migration by summarising its pitfalls. The second section of-
fers a short regionalisation of environmental change connected to climate change. 
To empirically substantiate the theoretical argument, the third section focuses on 
two coastal areas that have experienced environmental change for a long time: (A) 
Keta, which is located on the Gulf of Guinea in Ghana and (B) Semarang, situated 
on the northern coastline of Java in Indonesia. Here, we fi rst point out the main na-
tional features concerning the history of population dynamics, the speed and form 
1 The project „New regional formations: Environmental change and migration in coastal areas 
in Ghana and Indonesia” (2014-2016) was generously funded by the Volkswagen-Stiftung (Ger-
many). It was a joint project between the University of Bremen, Leibniz-Institute for Research on 
Society and Space Erkner, ZMT Bremen and KWI Essen. The empirical results presented here 
are the outcome of as well quantitative (use of existing demographic data and own survey and 
data) and qualitative research (including expert interviews, interviews with migrants, focus-
group discussions and observation, scrutinising of local reports and media) in the two regions 
as gathered by subproject 3 on “migrant trajectories”. Also, the authors wish to thank Usha 
Ziegelmayer and two anonymous reviewers for their highly valuable comments on a former 
version of this manuscript.
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of urbanisation, the socio-economic setting and development policies. In a second 
step, the two regional examples are analysed by interpreting the collected data. The 
conclusions argue that a detailed regional analysis reveals results that contradict 
common assumptions of a neat causality between climate change and population 
mobility.
2 State of the art: The role of climate change in population studies
Early migration literature such as Ravenstein (1885) mentioned climate as one fac-
tor infl uencing migration behaviour. Petersen (1958) assumed that “primitive migra-
tion” was the result of an ecological push: a movement related to man’s inability to 
cope with natural forces. From the 1960s onwards, this perspective received little 
attention, with rare exceptions such as Richmond (quoted in Hugo 1996: 110). Main-
stream migration studies after World War II basically concentrated on economic 
circumstances, operating with the analytical tool of push and pull factors such as 
income differentials and employment opportunities while disregarding regional 
circumstances (Todaro 1976). Meanwhile, Neo-Marxist macro-theory emphasized 
political-economic factors and paid little attention to environmental infl uences. 
The bulk of migration literature considered the issues of migrant assimilation in ur-
ban areas at arrival, employing a predominantly culturalist approach (which ethnic 
groups adapts best?). Apparently, the economic boom in the industrialised world 
left little space for the investigation of the eventual impact of environmental change 
on migration in these years (1960-1980). Furthermore, the social sciences devel-
oped quantitative analysis systems that rarely considered the relevance of the geo-
graphical setting and its ecological dimensions. From the late 1970s onwards, with 
the beginning debate on sustainability, the production of knowledge in the fi eld 
of environmental change and migration took a new turn. The report of the Club of 
Rome (1972), among the fi rst voices to introduce ecological concerns into the de-
velopment debate, identifi ed fi ve fi elds threatening economic growth: population 
increase, unbalanced food production, industrialisation, pollution, and the depletion 
of natural resources. A literature review identifi ed a total of 39 publications covering 
the nexus of climate change and migration in the 1980s. In the 1990s, 104 publica-
tions could be found, and between 2000 and 2008 179 publications were counted 
(Hillmann/Kronauer 2010). Today, the relationship between climate change and mi-
gration is at centre stage on the global political agenda.
The debate on a possible causality between climate change and migratory move-
ments took off in the mid-1980s, when El-Hinnawi (1985) and other experts labelled 
certain migrants as “environmental refugees” in an UNEP report – pointing out that 
in the near future “the gravest effects of climate change may be those on human 
migration as millions will be displaced.“ (as cited in Piguet et al. 2011: 4). The debate 
intended to raise public awareness about environmental issues. When Myers (1983) 
published the fi rst estimates and prognoses about the quantitative dimension of 
this category of migrants, the discussion took a new twist, as environmental degra-
dation was now interpreted as a major cause of migration. In the ensuing years, the 
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debate became increasingly alarmist. In 1995, a publication entitled “Environmental 
Exodus, An Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena” published by the Climate Institute 
(Washington, DC) obtained much attention (Myers/Kent 1995). The authors claimed 
that up to the year 2015, between 200 million to one billion people would be on the 
move due to environmental change. In 2006, the term “climate refugee” replaced 
the original “environmental refugee.” The UN and several NGOs started to think 
about establishing a global humanitarian action plan, building upon the heated cli-
mate change debate of the day. 
From the outset of the debate, this position – understanding environmental deg-
radation as a direct cause of large-scale displacement – was referred to as the “max-
imalist position” (Suhrke 1994: 20). The opposing position was fi rst taken by Rich-
ard Black in his book “Refugees, Environment and Development” (Black 1998). He 
claimed that the overall concept of environmental refugees was misleading and far 
too politicised, creating “horror scenarios,” as Steven Castles (2002) put it. Etienne 
Piguet (2010) contends that, in addition to the weak empirical base of much of the 
work on environmental refugees, the suggested linear relationship is highly debat-
able. This latter position, mainly found among migration experts, was called the 
“minimalist position.” In an early stage of the debate, Graeme Hugo pointed to en-
vironmental degradation (e.g. deforestation and pollution) in developing countries, 
but argued that many of the environmental changes were the results of all sorts of 
crises – including the refugee crisis itself. Additionally, the overexploitation of natu-
ral resources led to environmental degradation (Hugo 1996: 123).
Today, a wide range of studies on climate change exist, many of which have been 
funded by global organisations such as the IPCC, the World Bank, United Nations 
University, the OECD, as well as foundations such as the German Marshall Fund, the 
MacArthur Foundation, or NGOs such as the German Advisory Council on Global 
Change (WBGU) (2007). The EACH-FOR-project (Environmental Change and Forced 
Migration Scenarios), run in 2006 under the 6th Framework Programme of the Euro-
pean Commission, was highly relevant for the empirical endorsement of the debate. 
The study was conceived in a multi-disciplinary manner, combining desk studies 
with case study research in almost two dozen locations. It incorporated parts of 
Europe into its design, but emphasized understanding the processes in developing 
countries. Up to 2010, the focus of research was mostly on countries in the devel-
oping world, which were considered most vulnerable for climate change. From the 
outset, there was a regional emphasis on Africa (33 studies, with nine on Ghana) 
and Asia (36, with nine on Bangladesh) in empirical studies (Hillmann/Kronauer 
2010). Most of the studies were designed as case studies, based on a short time 
frame and a limited number of study participants. Interdisciplinary and longitudinal 
research was lacking from the outset (KNOMAD 2015). This bias points towards 
Western fears concerning mass migration rather than indicating actual empirical 
trends (Piguet et al. 2011: 15), but also shows the political interests fuelling the de-
bate from the side of the affected countries. Political representatives from states 
such as Bangladesh repeatedly expressed their concern about the effect of sea level 
rise on vulnerable coastal populations, contributing to the global awareness of a 
frightening development (Findlay/Geddes 2011: 138-139). Increasingly, migration 
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was promoted as a top national concern in industrialised countries (Afi fi /Warner 
2008: 20). Some researchers also claim that there is a “climate divide” within most 
countries, whereby data and projections on climate change are available only for 
the economically thriving and politically infl uential parts of the country, even if other 
regions are more affected by climate change (Glaeser/Glaser 2010: 143). Existing in-
stitutional linkages between NGOs and established local partners in the developing 
world might be one factor that reinforced this regional selectivity.
In addition to this empirical bias, sudden environmental events such as cyclones, 
fl oods or volcanic eruptions have been at the centre of public debate because 
they require quick and reliable relocation and resettlement on the spot. Therefore, 
these events easily attract media and NGO attention. Longer-term effects of cli-
mate change that risk increased fl ooding (i.e. sea level rise and glacier melt) will 
potentially make coastlines uninhabitable in the future, but are diffi cult to foresee. 
Similarly, the increased frequency and magnitude of weather-related acute natural 
hazards are complex to grasp (KNOMAD 2015). Furthermore, root causes such as 
environmental degradation and resource loss due to large-scale infrastructure pro-
jects (Tsikata 2006; Bleibaum 2010), urbanisation, commercial farming practices, 
export-led development policies, and land tenures practices (Rogers/Wang 2006), 
all of which impact local livelihoods, are diffi cult to isolate. This means that they 
generally receive less attention compared to migration. However, Tacoli (2011: 13-
14) examines cycles of intensifi ed environmental degradation and their devastat-
ing consequences on the livelihoods of people in Bolivia and Senegal occurring in 
conjunction with major economic and social upheaval. Recent phenomena, such as 
land-grabbing for producing biofuels instead of food crops, as well as the construc-
tion of infrastructure for mitigation itself (e.g. dams and water reservoirs or coastal 
sea defences), scarcely receive attention in the literature. 
Migration then constitutes only one adaptation strategy among others, linking 
migratory events more strongly to local adaptation strategies, dependent upon the 
vulnerability and resilience of households. Intraregional migration is one such pos-
sible adaptation pattern, differing for women and men (McLeman/Hunter 2010; Lac-
zko/Aghazarm 2009: 75). Anthropological literature explores whether the affected 
population can opt for other localised coping strategies, such as altered consump-
tion patterns, changed cropping patterns, seasonal migration and income diver-
sifi cation. Some researchers also mention possible local solutions to coping with 
environmental change, such as adaption in situ (e.g. heightening fl oors of houses, 
economic diversifi cation or short-distance mobility and shifts in crop production) 
(Handayani et al. 2015). Finally, questions of risk perception and the willingness to 
consider migration and other mobility as an option per se need to be taken into 
account by academic research (see van der Velde/Naerssen 2015 on the mental 
thresholds of migration).
Three analytical pitfalls can be identifi ed for the current debate: a high degree 
of politicisation, the use of blurred terminologies, and the mixing and confl ating of 
scales (e.g. local and global) (Hillmann et al. 2015). Interestingly, literature stemming 
from the affected countries themselves is likely to call for a multi-disciplinary ap-
proach for explaining migration realistically and for taking historical migration pat-
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terns into account (Awumbila/Ardayfi o-Schandorf 2008; Laczko/Aghazarm 2009: 
29; Muhidin 2014). 
3 Population Dynamics and Environmental change – a regionalisation
In this article, “climate change” is used as the overarching term for global warming 
and, in consequence, sea level rise. In contrast, “Environmental change” is under-
stood more broadly as including a vast array of degradations of the natural envi-
ronment, very often man-made. Geographers in migration research (e.g. Richard 
Black) acknowledge the problems of sea level rise, desertifi cation, deforestation, 
lack of water, salinisation and biodiversity depletion, but tend to interpret migration 
as an integrated part of the social and economic structure of the region in question. 
Similarly, Graeme Hugo stresses the impact of regional realities and acknowledges 
that morphology has an impact on the effects of climate change (Hugo 2013). He 
identifi es four main terrains in which climate change is anticipated to have a nega-
tive impact when combined with population growth:
• Coastal areas: inundation, storm surges, and sea level rise
• River valleys and deltas: increased riparian fl ooding
• Low lying island states: sea level rise, surface warming, and extreme 
weather events
• Semi-arid and low humidity areas: water shortages
Of course, other morphological regions such as the high mountain regions, areas 
characterised by permafrost (e.g. parts of Russia), or the melting of the ice shields at 
the poles also undergo strong environmental change. In addition, the severity of the 
impact on the various types of areas is contingent on the type of human economic 
activities in the area.
Generally, the IPCC sees coastal areas in developing countries as highly vulner-
able due to their comparatively low adaptive capacity – counting South, Southeast 
and East Asia and Africa as most vulnerable (IPCC 2014). In the case of Africa, it is 
expected that the low-lying coastal zones will experience high rates of population 
growth and urbanisation for decades to come, especially in Western and Eastern 
Africa (Neumann et al. 2015). In Asia, almost three-quarters of total population live 
in vulnerable low lying coastal zones (MacGranahan et al. 2007). The degradation 
of coastal and river delta ecosystems has detrimental impacts on the livelihoods 
of populations in these areas and is projected by the IPCC to lead to major popula-
tion displacements, increasing pressure on scarce resources in destination areas. 
Poorer populations living in vulnerable coastal areas bear the brunt of environmen-
tal hazards. Their exposure leads to a higher risk in morbidity, property damage 
and livelihood loss, and subsequently could increase their propensity for migration. 
Therefore, this article concentrates on the analysis of coastal areas.
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4 Regional examples of Population Dynamics and Environmental 
change in Ghana and Indonesia
This article uses the two examples of Keta (Ghana) and Semarang (Indonesia) to 
investigate how local realities that have long been prone to rapid environmental 
change make use of migration as one possible adaptation strategy. Methodological-
ly, the comparison aims to contrast two regional realities, not compare the two cas-
es to one other. This approach allows for fl exibility in the research design because 
it gives the researcher the possibility to refl ect on one case in light of the other. The 
New Regional Formations project, which we refer to here (cf. Footnote 1), aimed at 
identifying the emergence of “new regional formations”, new constellations of a 
variety of actors that reconnect local realities to greater development dynamics and 
that increasingly (re)position themselves on the regional level using the discourse 
on climate change as a vehicle for their policies (Herbeck 2015). Such new spatial 
and political confi gurations infl uence existing power symmetries within the nation-
state, generate supranational governance structures, and are likely to become more 
powerful in the near future (Soja 2015: 373-374). The following section fi rst sum-
marises the common features of the two countries and then gives an introduction 
into the developmental, environmental and demographic characteristics of these 
national settings. Next, the two regional realities are presented separately. Here, the 
main fi ndings of the survey and qualitative research will be presented. 
4.1 Common features of the two chosen examples
The two regions chosen for empirical research are parts of larger national struc-
tures, which are themselves parts of supranational regional organisations (ECO-
WAS in Western Africa and ASEAN in Southeast Asia). Ghana and Indonesia are 
tightly linked to the global economy, and they show signifi cant international migra-
tion fl ows. By HDI, both countries are classifi ed as countries with “Medium Human 
Development”, hosting a growing middle class population. Ghana and Indonesia 
have a predominantly young population, both countries face high poverty rates, in-
equality and situations of vulnerability among the major part of the population. The 
annual average population growth is around 2,5 percent in Ghana and 1,5 percent 
in Indonesia – each showing a slow but steady decrease of this rate since 1985. Life 
expectancy is about 60 years in Ghana and 70 years in Indonesia. Both countries are 
diverse in ethnicity and religion. Equally, the urban and rural populations are fairly 
balanced, showing an overall share of urbanisation of 53 percent for Indonesia and 
Ghana alike; the average rate of change of the share of urbanisation for 2010-15 is 
1.3 percent (Ghana) and 1.5 percent (Indonesia) (United Nations 2014). Both Ghana 
and Indonesia were colonies until the 1950s, under British and Dutch administra-
tion, respectively.
The two countries are part of larger migratory systems – the West African and 
the Asia Pacifi c regimes – and have extensive diasporas. The net migration rates for 
the period 2010-15 are -0.8 (-100,000 migrants) and -0.6 (-700.000) for Ghana and 
Indonesia respectively (United Nations 2013b). In the 1960s and 1970s, Ghana was 
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an important country of immigration, mainly attracting migrants from neighbouring 
countries to work on the plantations and in the timber industry. The mass expul-
sion in 1969 of a quarter of a million immigrants originating from Niger, Nigeria, 
Togo, and Burkina Faso marked the start of a decade of economic recession. Cocoa 
production slumped due to labour shortages, and, coupled with hyperinfl ation and 
droughts, caused severe economic recession. From then on, Ghana experienced 
a transition from an immigration to an emigration country, especially after oil was 
discovered in Nigeria. Many Ghanaians went to work in the oil industry, but the Ivory 
Coast and Togo were also countries of destination. In 1983 and 1985, there were 
mass forced expulsions from Nigeria, which included more than a million Ghanaians 
who were forced to return to Ghana, replacing many Burkinabé immigrants who 
(forcefully) returned home (Spaan/van Moppes 2006; Tankwanchi 2012). In recent 
decades, growing labour forces with bleak employment prospects, coupled with 
economic stagnation, have increasingly led to emigration. As in other West and 
East African countries in particular, the emigration of highly skilled workers, such 
as doctors, nurses, and architects, caused a brain-drain situation which has further 
exacerbated economic problems (Anyangwe/Mtonga 2007; Teye et al. 2014; Tank-
wanchi 2012). 
In contrast, Indonesia shows a low net migration rate, although in absolute num-
bers international migration is signifi cant, given Indonesia’s population of almost 
250 million. Traditionally, Indonesian labour migrants are low skilled workers, tem-
porarily working abroad in agriculture, construction, and manufacturing, with the 
bulk of women working as domestic workers and caregivers. A large proportion of 
international labour migration is undocumented, particularly to neighbouring Ma-
laysia and Singapore. The main destinations of Indonesian labour migrants are the 
Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, and Jordan) and countries in 
Southeast and East Asia, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, the Re-
public of Korea, and Taiwan. The Indonesian diaspora is estimated at 2–6 million 
and beyond the countries listed above can be found in Europe (Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Sweden), Japan, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Mauri-
tius, Surinam, Australia and the Americas (Muhidin/Utomo 2013).
There are considerable regional differences in population growth and urbanisa-
tion rates in both countries. Greater Accra, Ashanti and Central regions in Ghana 
and the provinces of Banten, West-Java, Riau and East Kalimantan in Indonesia have 
the highest rates in their respective countries. Internal migration fl ows contribute 
to urban population growth in both countries. The general direction of migration in 
Ghana and Indonesia – from the north to coastal cities in the south in the case of 
Ghana, and from the outer islands to the coastal urban centres on Java in Indone-
sia – puts increasing pressure on the urban infrastructure and environment in the 
coastal regions of their countries.
Environmental change is a component of broad development problems. De-
forestation is a major concern: between 1990 and 2011, forest area declined by 
20.9 percent in Indonesia and 35.2 percent in Ghana (UNDP 2014). Although part of 
deforestation is caused by smallholder slash-and-burn agriculture and charcoal pro-
duction, a major determining factor is a political economy favouring economic profi t 
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over conservation, backed by powerful interest groups including political elites and 
multinationals such as palm oil producers and mining companies (Hansen et al. 
2009; Indrarto et al. 2012; Arnold 2014).
Both countries are faced by severe environmental issues in cities and coastal 
areas due to virtually non-existent recycling and waste processing. Further major 
environmental risks include sea level rise, fl oods, salinisation, mangrove forest de-
pletion, pollution, and droughts. Both countries have implemented resettlement 
programs due to environmental problems, including those related to large infra-
structural projects such as the erection of hydroelectric power plants and dams. 
Both coastlines either have a sea defence (Ghana) or will in the future (Indonesia) 
in 2017.
In Ghana, the development of an estate economy during colonial rule fostered 
historical patterns of in-migration from the country’s north and from neighbour-
ing countries. The main pattern of migration in Ghana has thus been from north to 
south, with a steadily increasing rate except for 1970–85, a period of economic de-
cline. Most low-skilled migrants hailing from the north moved to the cities of Kumasi 
in Central Ghana and to coastal cities such as Accra, Cape Coast and Tema. Further-
more, many migrated to work in agriculture in the country’s middle belt and cocoa 
farming in the southwest (Van der Geest 2011). From 2000-10, the highest popula-
tion growth rates were recorded for Greater Accra and Central regions (3.1 per-
cent), with lower rates for Northern Region (2.9 percent), Ashanti (2.7 percent) and 
Volta (2.5 percent). The poorest regions – Upper East (1.2 percent) and Upper West 
(1.9 percent) – recorded lowest rates (Ghana Statistical Service 2012).
Although it is often suggested that environmental degradation, exacerbated 
by changing climatic conditions (e.g. rising temperatures; erratic rainfall) is a main 
driver for out-migration, research in Ghana has shown that structural environmental 
scarcity and limited non-farm employment opportunities underlie population mobil-
ity patterns. Researchers have argued that poverty, the scarcity of arable land, and 
political factors ultimately weigh more heavily than environmental stress (Van der 
Geest 2011). Decentralisation and growth-pole strategies are drivers of mobility and 
urbanisation in Ghana (Yaro et al. 2011), and internal movement in Ghana is more 
prominent than in Indonesia (though smaller in absolute numbers). Ghana’s fi ve-
year crude migration intensity (between 3.5-6 percent in 2000, measured in 10 and 
110 regional units) is higher than that of Indonesia (between 0.8-4 percent in 2000, 
for 7 and 314 regions). Lifetime crude migration intensity in Ghana is 17.8-27.8 per-
cent (2000, 10 and 110 regions), four times higher than in Indonesia (4.1-8.4 percent 
in 2000, for 7 and 26 regions) (United Nations 2013a: 8, 12).2
Indonesia is an island nation with over 240 million inhabitants (2010), half of 
whom live on the island of Java. Up to 65 percent of Java’s population of around 138 
million live in coastal regions (Kementerian Negara Lingkungan Hidup 2007) and is 
2 Crude Migration Intensity (CMI) is calculated for a number of levels of spatial disaggregation, 
and computed by expressing the total number of internal migrants (M) in a given time period as 
a percentage of the population at risk (P) such that CMI = 100M/P.
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therefore particular exposed to environmental change. The sheer size of the Indone-
sian archipelago (2 million km2 with over 18,000 islands) and its enormous diversity 
in terms of morphological, cultural and socio-economic characteristics translates 
into highly diverse patterns of population movement. Its history of large-scale mi-
gration within the country, both voluntary and regulated, is varied in terms of skill 
levels, destination and temporality. The various regional migration systems centre 
on the island of Java, but also focus on other growth poles such as the SIJORI trian-
gle (a transnational development region, including the Indonesian Riau archipelago, 
Johor in Malaysia and Singapore), and North Sumatra and Southeast Kalimantan.
An analysis of interprovincial movement shows major population movements 
between the peripheral islands and Java and Bali. Still, there are also other sig-
nifi cant population movements, both circular and more permanent, at the regional. 
For example, there is longstanding migration from Java, north and south Sumatra, 
and East Kalimantan linked to the estate economy and extractive industries (Spaan 
1999). These regions also function as a transition corridor for international migration 
to Malaysia, Singapore, and further afi eld. In fact, analysis of recent migration pat-
terns shows that migration levels at the inter-district level are higher in comparison 
to inter-island and inter-provincial levels for all age groups (Muhidin 2014: 326). 
Although it is hard ascertain common patterns of population mobility, the envi-
ronment, agro-ecological zones, and related economic activities are interrelated. 
Generally, the direction of migration is from the uplands and poorer islands in east-
ern Indonesia, areas which are generally arid, less fertile and lacking resources, to-
wards the lower coastal areas and the islands of Java and Bali, with intensive farm-
ing and agro-industry. The bulk of industrial, public services, health, tourism, and 
education is located in urban agglomerations, many of which are situated along the 
coastline. The rapidly changing Indonesian workforce contributes to the urbanisa-
tion trend: as the proportion of primary school graduates in the workforce declines, 
over 50 percent of the total increase in 2002-2012 are secondary and tertiary gradu-
ates (due to successful educational policies in recent years). While agriculture still 
forms the bulk of labour demand (almost 40 percent in 2012), formal and informal 
non-farm employment account for around one third each (Manning/Purnagunawan 
2014: 346). The major migration destination on the island of Java is the urban ag-
glomeration around Jakarta (Jabodetabek).3 
Although Indonesia has a long history of government migration policies aimed 
at population redistribution to relieve pressure on Java and Bali (e.g. the Transmi-
gration program), data on interprovincial migration for the years between 1930 and 
2000 indicates that economic factors were far more important than the resettlement 
programs (Van Lottum/Marks 2012). 
The following sections introduce the two regional examples of Keta and Sema-
rang. First, the respective socio-economic structure and the adopted development 
policies in the two regions will be highlighted. Next, the ongoing environmental 
3 Jabodetabek is the acronym for the urban agglomeration around the capital, comprising Ja-
karta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi with an estimated population of 30 million.
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changes will be discussed. Finally, the results of the empirical study concerning 
the demographic structure and migration pattern will be analysed in light of these 
changes. 
A Case study: Keta, Ghana4
The fi rst case study concerns a coastal area in the lower Volta region in southeast-
ern Ghana. Keta town is located close to the mouth of the Volta river on the Gulf of 
Guinea. It lies on a sandspit between the Atlantic and Keta lagoon (see Fig 1). The 
agro-ecological zone is coastal savannah, characterised by poor soils, mangrove 
swamps and a bimodal rainfall pattern (approx. 700-800 mm/annum) (U.S. Forest 
Service 2011). Historically, the region was an important port of call for the trade in 
slaves, spices and gold, and important for fi sh processing (Akyeampong 2001). The 
population of Keta mainly lives off farming, fi shing, salt and copra production and 
trade. The poverty incidence rate of the Keta region was between 40-50 percent in 
2000 (Coulombe/Wodon 2007) and remains high. The Keta lagoon thus forms an 
important natural resource for food security, and is designated as a critical habitat 
for migratory birds and endangered marine turtles (U.S. Forest Service 2011). Keta 
is part of the Anlo-Ewe region, which has distinctive environmental, cultural and 
linguistic traits that stretch into the neighbouring Togo. Keta suffers from coastal 
erosion, loss of housing and declining lagoon fi sh stocks. The prominence of the 
market and trading function of Keta has faded and shifted to the city of Anloga in the 
same municipality, only 15 km southwest along the coast. 
Ghanaian livelihoods, particularly of the poor in rural areas, are highly dependent 
on natural resources, which are currently under threat both by climate change and 
by non-sustainable human exploitation, resulting in erosion, deforestation, pollu-
tion and declining soil fertility and marine resources (U.S. Forest Service 2011). For 
the Volta river basin, a report warns that due to climate change impacts (i.e. higher 
temperatures and less, more erratic rainfall), river fl ow will decrease signifi cantly, 
jeopardising food production, animal husbandry and hydro-power production in the 
Volta river watershed. In particular, the predicted greater variance in water availabil-
4 A total of 274 households were included into the sample, for a total of 1.345 people. The inter-
views were conducted in selected villages and towns suffering ongoing rapid environmental 
change. Households within these villages were selected by random sampling supported by GIS 
techniques: Afi adenyigba (n=49), Anloga (n=49), Blekusu (n=24), Genui (n=24), Kedzi (n=25), 
Keta Town (n=48), Tegbi (n=50), N.N. (n=5). Six Ewe-speaking interviewers conducted the sur-
vey in early 2015. Keta had 58 percent male-headed and 42 percent female-headed households, 
and a 47 percent male and 53 percent female population overall. Additionally, 95 experts, key 
informants, and migrants were interviewed. For the purpose of this study, we defi ned “mi-
grants” as persons who leave their household for more than three consecutive months in or-
der to live in another sub-district or community of Keta. The respondents were the household 
heads, who were asked about all household members who once used to live in the household 
and then moved away for more than three consecutive months. The qualitative data were gath-
ered through semi-structured interviews with migrant households from Keta in Accra and Togo, 
two destinations of migration from Keta. Further key informant interviews with traditional and 
state authorities in Keta added to our knowledge base.
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ity and lower groundwater recharge will have a detrimental impact on the rain-fed 
and irrigated agriculture common in the area. In Keta district, erosion, fl oods, tidal 
waves and wind storms have been reported in recent years. The coast has seriously 
eroded and the many houses that are permanently inundated pose great obstacles 
to (traditional) seine fi shing. The following anthropogenic environmental hazards in 
the Volta basin including Keta coastal area have occurred: bush fi res, depletion of 
fi sh stocks and clam beds (Torvikey 2014), groundwater pollution and silting of la-
goon and rivers due to farming activity and deleterious fi shing practices (e.g. use of 
agro-chemicals and TNT). Furthermore, groundwater depletion due to groundwater 
extraction for the salt-winning industry is common, in turn ruining local coconut 
groves. 
Regional development policies emphasized industrialisation and large-scale in-
frastructure projects. In the 1960s, a hydroelectric power dam at Akosombo in the 
Upper Volta Region was constructed, followed by the smaller Kpong dam down-
stream, completed in 1982. In 2013, the Bui Dam came into operation. The develop-
ment of hydro-electric dams has both positive and negative consequences. Power 
generation, industrial output (e.g. aluminium) and growth of economically vibrant 
urban centres such as Tema and Akosombo, and employment growth in the form of 
lakeside fi shing count among the positives. The construction also lead to decreases 
in diseases such as river blindness and sleeping sickness due to the fl ooding of the 
breeding grounds of disease vectors, i.e. black fl ies and tsetse fl ies (Tsikata 2006).
Fig. 1: The Location of the case-study, Keta (Ghana)
Source: Kartenwerkstatt TU Berlin, 2017
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The downside is the inundation of villages, farms, burial and religious sites, 
forced resettlement and social disruption.5 The dams have contributed to the loss 
of forest, drastic changes in fi sh stocks downstream due to changes in water tem-
perature and turbidity, coastal erosion and a silting of the estuary (Akyeampong 
2001). The lower water levels due to dam construction upriver have resulted in the 
drying up of creeks, droughts and the emergence of pests (e.g. Cape St. Paul Wilt 
disease), negatively affecting downstream fl ora and copra production. The process 
of beach sedimentation along the coast has been disrupted due to dam construc-
tion, threatening the habitat of locals.6 Livelihoods are seriously affected by the loss 
of arable land, forest resources and the disappearance of creek and clam fi shing, 
the latter traditionally being a major activity for local women. Moreover, an increase 
in the incidence of bilharzia and malaria has occurred due to slowing down of the 
river and through cross-infection via migrating Ewe and Ada fi shermen and -women 
from endemic areas in lower Volta (Akyeampong 2001; Tsikata 2006).
Although Ghana has signed various conventions on environment, wildlife con-
servation, and climate change, and formulated policies on sustainable development, 
there is no specifi c policy on the coastal zone (Amlalo 2006; Boateng 2006). The fail-
ures and political diffi culties involved in addressing the longstanding environmental 
problems of the Anlo-Ewe region including Keta are well documented (Akyeam-
pong 2001). Locals have expressed their discontent with the fact that development 
efforts were mainly aimed towards the regions west of the Volta, as exemplifi ed by 
the construction of the harbour and industries at Tema, giving a fi nal blow to Keta’s 
former harbour function. Despite the serious damage to Keta’s housing and infra-
structure caused by erosion throughout the years, and after several failed coastline 
protection attempts since 1960, it was only in 1998 that the large-scale Keta Sea 
Defense started being planned (see Fig. 2).
The project involved the construction of a sea wall, beach stabilisation (e.g. 
groynes; concrete block revetment), causeways, land reclamation and fl ood con-
trol structures. The $90 million project is justifi ed by the government not only as 
a means of protection for Ghanaian citizens, but also as securing local industry, 
fi shery, commerce and promoting (eco-) tourism.7 However, sea defense measures 
have failed in some cases due to inadequate design and construction (Coastal Re-
search Center 2013). Secondary effects such as downstream erosion had initially 
not been considered, but have emerged are a result of the sea defense construction 
works, according to local experts. Local inhabitants had to be resettled to newly 
built communities near Kedzi to the east of Keta town. 
5 The Akosombo Dam alone led to the inundation of an estimated 4 percent (3275 sq. miles) of 
Ghana‘s land mass (Jopp 1965) and the resettlement of 80,000 people from 739 villages (Yaro et 
al. 2011).
6 Climate Change Threatens Ghana‘s coast. Al Jazeera, 28 Dec 2013, at: http://www.aljazeera.
com/indepth/features/2013/12/climate-change-threatens-ghana-coast-2013129114224783683.
html.
7 In Ada Foah, along the Volta southwest of Keta, another 160 million Euro sea defense project is 
built, with the aims of shoreline stabilisation, fl ood control, and increasing tourism potential (a 
sea turtle breeding site).
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More recently, the discovery of oil deposits around the Keta lagoon is expected 
to have a signifi cant impact on local economic activities, as it would affect offshore 
fi sheries and the natural environment. Local development plans include petrochem-
ical and cement plants, for which government land reclamation around the lagoon 
has taken place. Moreover, a canal is planned to be dredged between Keta lagoon 
and the Volta river estuary to facilitate transport, trade, and tourism. These activi-
ties are expected to boost the economy and employment, but they could also be 
detrimental to the environment and local fi shery industry.
The population of Keta has shrunk since 1960, but increased slightly between 
2000 and 2010. Whereas the population stood at 16,719 in 1960, it declined to 14,446 
in 1970 (-14 percent), 12,595 in 1984 (-13 percent) and 8,101 in 2000 (-36 percent) 
(Yaro et al. 2011: 37-38; based on population census data). Despite the declining 
economic importance of Keta, there is still limited (seasonal) in-migration from 
neighbouring regions for education and work in fi shing, trade and construction. 
Nevertheless, the Keta area is mainly an area of out-migration, as our respondents 
stated. In large part, migration consists of seasonal movements, varying from sev-
eral months to a few years, e.g. for fi shing or trade, whereby people move upstream 
and to other coastal cities. Many also venture abroad to destinations in West Af-
rica, mainly Ivory Coast (Abidjan) and Togo (Lomé). Local fi shermen temporarily 
Fig. 2: The sea defence in Keta Town
Source: photo by F. Hillmann, 2014
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move along the coast as far away as Sierra Leone and even Angola: “you see the 
fi shermen migrating with the fi sh” (interview partner). Interviews with fi shermen 
and local experts made it clear that this mobility was necessitated by diminishing 
catches along the coastline due to overfi shing by European and Chinese trawlers 
and because of the insuffi cient meshes used by many local fi shermen. Women, who 
traditionally sell the fi sh at the market, complain that the changes in Keta started 
a vicious cycle of downgrading, producing out-migration. As one of our interview 
partners states
“In the event that men do not get fi sh, it implies that they were not going 
to get money to fend for the family. It is this same fi sh that we women 
also buy to smoke and sell, so we are also not able to raise money even 
if we get the fi shes to smoke and there is no one to buy them. When the 
fi shes are not sold, we are as well unable to pay the men and thus the 
situation affects almost anybody”. (Interview 26, market woman)
The notion of mobility is deeply rooted in the regional tradition of the Anlo-Ewe. 
A migration saga, related to the Ewe-Anlo fi shermen, is kept alive and is still recited 
by the local population (Kumassah 2009). Today, the Hogbetsoso festival, which 
commemorates the exodus of the Anlos from Notisie in the Republic of Togo, is 
celebrated annually. The saga exemplifi es the mobility that was vital to the life of the 
Anlo people over the centuries.
Indeed, our survey revealed a highly mobile population. A quarter of all house-
holds reported to have one or two circular migrants (mostly moving to Accra) stay-
ing away less than half a year. Only a tiny share of households, 5 percent, reported 
to have members that stayed away for more than two years. Circular migration 
was directed mainly, 68 percent, towards (Greater) Accra and the Keta lagoon. Re-
turn migrants, defi ned as persons who lived away for more than three consecutive 
months during the past fi ve years, lived in 27 percent of the interviewed house-
holds. When asked about the professional status of the household-heads, 21 per-
cent said to own a business, 16 percent were artisans, another 16 percent fi shermen 
and 15 percent were retired. The majority, 56 percent, owned the land on which 
they lived. The results of the survey point out that out-migration was mainly di-
rected towards Accra, in 71 percent of all cases, while some, 8 percent, ventured 
to neighbouring African countries such as Benin, Nigeria and Togo. Very few also 
migrated to Europe and the US via Accra. Half of the interviewed migrants said to 
have received assistance for their migration, mostly money from other household-
members. No agencies – as often the case in international migration – were used 
to facilitate the migration. For many households having a member abroad meant 
an additional source of income and thus a net reduction in risk. About one third 
(30 percent) of all interviewed households said that they received remittances from 
migrated household members, generally between 100 to 499 Cedi8 per year (con-
tributing to an average income of around 4.000 Cedi per year). About 7 percent of 
8 100 Ghanaian Cedi are equivalent to $31 (January 2015). Fisherman earn around 2 Cedi a day, 
the minimum wage is 5 or 6 Cedis a day (interview 21, 2014).
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these migrants provided food for the household. Out of the 583 migrants in the 
sample, men made up 53 percent. Most migrated at the ages of 10-29, elder people 
moved only rarely. 58 percent of the migrants stated that they went away for work. 
Much of the migration, 24 percent, was due to educational aspirations, a tenth to 
family reasons. Indeed, apart from secondary schools, the region offers very few 
tertiary institutions, and none of them offer training for local employment. As one 
of our interviewees claims:
”What you are trained with, you cannot be employed here, you can only 
be employed outside. That is why many of us who are literate must 
go elsewhere for employment […] So, everybody who wants to further 
their education must move out […]”. 
Environmental change had an impact on livelihoods. Only a small share of our 
respondents (0,7 percent) said that they moved due to environmental reasons, de-
spite the fact that 167 households out of 288, 60 percent, said to have experienced 
damage to the personal property or health through extreme environmental events. 
According to our data, migrants could count on support for their migration from 
other household members, relatives and migrated relatives. Priests and local chiefs 
had a limited say in the decision to migrate for most of our respondents. 
Our sample showed a rather positive attitude towards migration: 59 percent of 
all respondents said that migrants could come back even if they fail in making a 
living elsewhere, 64 percent thought that households with a migrant are better off 
than those without, 53 percent of respondents said that they were in favour of go-
ing away. Family ties turned out to play an important role for migration decisions, as 
half of all interviewees stated that children should ask their parents before moving 
away. There is clearly a cultural obligation to take care of one’s parents.
In Keta, as in some other places in the Volta region, out-migration has produced 
a relatively new phenomenon of socio-economic organisation. In addition to the 
common way of choosing chiefs from specifi c families or clans, a second category 
of chiefs is now selected on the basis of their resources to help develop the region, 
resulting in a new group of “development chiefs”.  A local chief points out:
 “But now for prestige’s sake, fi rst of all the chief can be anybody wheth-
er educated or not, but now they want an educated chief, especially 
when the person is rich and they think he/she can help in terms of devel-
opment. So, these chiefs are called development chiefs”.
Traditionally elected chiefs might also reside outside Keta and still be involved 
in local policies and development. A main goal is to secure connections to NGOs 
and to increase the contact with ministers to elicit help. Diaspora associations such 
as the Council of Ewe Associations of North America (CEANA) also engage in local 
politics. A member of the association explains this process as follows:
“And currently we help a school, also in the Volta region. Some of our 
colleagues went to Ghana and went to the school and saw how the con-
dition was and they came and did a presentation and the association 
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decided to help out. They decided to do some fundraising, some books 
and coins, and then we started also with fellowships for pupils”.
This help was widely accepted by the resident population and was also men-
tioned by the diaspora interview partners.
The outcome of our research on the articulation of migration and population 
dynamics in the local setting of Keta (which is repeatedly fl ooded) points to migra-
tion as having emerged as part of an increase in urbanisation, rather than due to the 
challenges of environmental change themselves. The local population is well aware 
of the dangers of environmental change, but the overexploitation of resources (fi sh-
ing), the downgrading of the market and trading functions, and the better education 
opportunities in the urban centres have a far greater impact on their lives. Most 
mobility is still internal, but migration to the urban hubs, to neighbouring countries, 
and to Europe and the US is a well-known form of mobility. Overall, migrants abroad 
and the long-term diaspora contribute to local development.
B Case-study: Semarang regency and city, Indonesia9
The second example presented here is the town of Semarang (Kota Semarang), a 
regency (Kabupaten) on the north coast of Central Java, Indonesia. The total popula-
tion of Central Java was 32.6 million in 2012, up from 31.2 million in 2000 (BPS 2014). 
The region is already highly urbanised, and increasingly so: the urbanisation rate 
was 40.4 percent in 2000, 56.2 percent in 2010 and is projected to grow to 73.8 per-
cent in 2025 (Indonesian Statistical Bureau, 31 May 2010). Central Java is tradition-
ally a region of out-migration.
The Semarang Metropolitan Area (SMA), also called “Kedung Sepur,” is des-
ignated as one of Indonesia’s national strategic growth areas (MP3EI 2011), and 
consists of the cities of Semarang, Salatiga and Purwodadi and four adjacent dis-
tricts (Kendal, Demak, Ungaran, Grobogan), with a population of around 5.4 mil-
lion people (in 2010). Semarang city proper, as a major sea port, transportation 
hub, and important industrial, service, and manufacturing centre with aquaculture 
9 A total of 334 households has been included into the sample, portraying a total of 1.417 peo-
ple, 265 outmigrants and 129 inmigrants. The interviews were done in selected kecamatan 
sub-districts)which suffer ongoing rapid environmental change, especially fl ooding, in Sema-
rang (in Tugu, Semarang Berat, Semarang Utara, Semarang Timur, Genuk, Semarang Tengah, 
Tembalang), Households have been selected by random sampling and have been supported 
by GIS-techniques. The sample was carried out in the months November/December 2014. The 
respondents were composed as follows: 82 percent male-headed, 18 percent female-headed 
households representing 1,417 household members (48 percent male, 52 percent female). For 
the purpose of this study we defi ned “migrants” as persons who leave their household for more 
than three consecutive months in order to live in another place, at least another sub-district 
(Ind.: Kecamatan)of Semarang City or another Municipality respectively or further away. The 
respondents in the survey were the household heads who were asked about all household 
members who once used to live in the household and then moved away for more than three 
consecutive months. Additionally, 92 experts, key-informants and migrants were interviewed. 
In Semarang the qualitative interviews consisted of key informant interviews with heads of vil-
lages and sub-districts in Semarang Municipality.
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(fi sh, shrimp farms) and agro-industry, forms the core of the Kedungsepur regional 
growth pole, linking the city with the urban and rural economies in the hinterland, 
including timber, textiles and foodstuff production. In the late 1990s, Semarang Port 
added a container wharf to be able to handle the rapidly increasing volume of con-
tainer cargo. In the past years, the regional distinction between rural and urban is 
becoming blurred, as Semarang is becoming increasingly linked to Yogyakarta on 
the southern coast of Central Java via an urban corridor.
Semarang city itself had a population of 1.5 million in 2011 (BAPPEDA BPS Kota 
Semarang 2012), with a population density of 23,000 people per km2 (Mulyana et al. 
2013) stretching over approx. 374 km² (see Fig. 3). Semarang’s population includes 
a signifi cant proportion of ethnic Chinese and Arabs (Suryadinata et al. 2003), a 
refl ection of the city’s history as a major port and international trading centre, with 
strong linkages to the outer islands and abroad. The territory is divided into three 
morphologically distinct zones: a lowland area (zero to 3.5 metres above sea level) 
in the north, a plain zone with higher elevation (3.5-90 metres) and a highland area 
(90-348 metres) (Hadipuro 2012). Although the largest part of the city is located on 
higher ground, the highest population concentrations are in the low-lying alluvial 
zone along the coast. About 30.000 people live in the coastal area of which many 
depend on agriculture (fi shermen and farmers). 
Fig. 3: The Location of the case-study, Semarang (Indonesia)
Source: Kartenwerkstatt TU Berlin
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Due to its location on the northern littoral, the population of Semarang is prone 
to environmental hazards.10 Beyond the low elevation along the coast, mangrove 
depletion, tidal processes, excessive groundwater extraction, and construction 
load, tidal inundation, erosion and water pollution are the main causes for land sub-
sidence (Marfai et al. 2008; Marfai 2011; Hadipuro 2012). Land subsidence in Sema-
rang is nurtured by rapid urbanisation and the conversion of land into industrial and 
residential areas, a process that has been ongoing for decades. However, problems 
of soil erosion, downstream sedimentation and fl ooding in the lower watersheds are 
also the result of forest management policies in the highlands (logging; conversion 
of teak forests to pine production forests; Paripurno 2006). Furthermore, Semarang 
is experiencing changes in average surface temperatures and precipitation pat-
terns, shifts in wet and dry seasons, and increased frequencies of extreme weather 
events such as droughts and intense rainfall (CCROM, cited in Mulyana et al. 2013). 
The city also suffers from rain fl oods. This fl ooding is exacerbated by sand mining 
and housing development in the highlands, as well as the poor sewerage and waste 
management systems in the city (Hadipuro 2012). Semarang was included in the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s “100 Resilient Cities” program, and has undergone a vari-
ety of adaptation and mitigation measures.11 Among the most conspicuous adapta-
tion strategies are the introduction of an Early Warning System in 2012, and the now 
widely acknowledged initiatives to replant mangroves near fi shponds (Yuniartanti 
et al. 2016 ). To prevent fl ooding caused by sea-level rise, the erection of a “giant sea 
wall” on the northern coast is planned for 2017 – meaning that fi shermen no longer 
would be able to fi sh in the shallow waters along the coastline.
The above-mentioned mixture of environmental conditions has signifi cant det-
rimental consequences for local livelihoods, the community’s social fabric, and 
population health. Populations in coastal areas and slum dwellers without well-built 
housing and proper sanitation facilities are particularly vulnerable. However, Mulya-
na (Mulyana et al. 2013) indicates that high-risk areas do not necessarily house poor 
residents with impermanent housing. It is the level of vulnerability and capacity to 
successfully employ coping mechanisms that counts rather than income level per 
se (Mulyana et al. 2013).12
10 Mulyana et al. (2013: 13ff.) identify the following areas as particularly vulnerable in the face of 
environmental change: the lowland regions, which are exposed to coastal fl ooding and sea 
level rise; settlement areas located in riverbeds, which are exposed to tidal and fl ash fl ooding; 
hilly areas, which are exposed to high winds; and areas that are exposed to land movement and 
landslides.
11 The Adaptation strategies promoted throughout the Resilient Cities program included a Coastal 
area climate information system with the purpose to increase resilience. Further, Community 
groups in coastal Semarang replanted mangroves to stabilise the fi shponds and strengthen the 
seaboard. New forms of ecotourism (often addressing high schools) were initiated next to fi sh 
cultivation (milkfi sh and shrimp). Fish-cracker (krupuk) production by women‘s groups were 
set-up as part of resilience measures.
12 The authors measure vulnerability with indices of hazard exposure, population indicators (e.g. 
population density, dependency ratios) and household indicators (e.g. secure tenure index, 
quality of housing amenities). 
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One might expect that these precarious circumstances would lead to high(er) 
rates of out-migration in frequently fl ooded areas. However, the Semarang agglom-
eration is an area of in-migration. Of the six major kota (municipalities) in Central 
Java (Magelang, Pekalongan, Surakarta, Salatiga, Semarang and Tegal), only Se-
marang recorded positive net lifetime migration (261.183) in the 2010 census; re-
cent migration was also only positive in Semarang (59.333) (BPS 2012). Semarang 
regency, however, had a negative net migration (-274.229). Semarang remains an 
important pole of attraction for people from all over Indonesia seeking education 
and employment in the metro area. The population of the city of Semarang is gradu-
ally increasing due to natural population growth and in-migration. The net migration 
rate of Semarang was 2.24 in 2011; with the in-migration rate being 28.44 and the 
out-migration rate 26.21 (BPS 2014). Authors such as Handayani et al. (2015) point 
to a substantial share of undocumented in-migration. Sub-districts that have net 
out-migration rates in 2011 are Candisari, Gayamsari, Semarang Selatan, Timur, Ut-
ara, Tengah and Barat. These areas within the low-elevation coastal zone have high 
population densities and some suffer from environmental hazards such as fl ooding 
(Mulyana et al. 2013; BPS 2014). 
How to explain the in-migration into the fl ooded areas? Our survey reveals a 
rather stable population in these districts. Indicators for this stability include the 
low share of return migrants, mainly spending time somewhere else in Java for 
2-3 months, which was reported by only 6 percent of the respondents. Also, most 
in-migrants (54.3 percent) came to Semarang for family reasons, usually marriage. 
Nearly one third (30.7 percent) was seeking a job, and 10,2 percent said to have 
come for educational reasons.
Generally, migrants are more vulnerable as they are more likely to end up in 
areas with poorer housing and amenities. They often lack social support networks, 
making them less resilient to environmental hazards. However, our research in the 
low-income high-risk areas showed that the local population opted for local adapta-
tion measures such as the strengthening and raising of houses, rather than moving 
away. Almost half (46 percent) of our interview partners had already heightened 
their house, by about 1-2 meters every fi ve years, on average (see Fig. 4). Further-
more, these areas turned out to be the destination for in-migrants, to which the in-
habitants sometimes sub-rent. Poorer households either lacked the fi nancial means 
for housing improvements and for fi nancing migration. They are therefore locked 
down and completely dependent on local employment opportunities in manufac-
turing, (informal) services, trade and fi shing. 75 percent of our survey respondents 
owned the house in which they lived, while only 5.4 percent rented the house they 
lived in. Some of the interviewees listed “attachment to place” as a reason for stay-
ing. Others alluded to the distrust in the government when it comes to questions of 
compensation in case of resettlement. Informally, the relocation of population has 
been attempted in the past years, as the interviewed experts reported. In total, our 
sample portrayed a stable population in the different Keluharan, most having lived 
there for more than a generation. Immobility is nearly synonymous with missing 
opportunities, and as an expert puts it, “the lights of the city shine brighter than the 
fl ooding”.
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Here, resilience is the strategy of the poor who have no other place to go: 
“People who stay in the coastal area are not wealthy people, they are 
used to the conditions of fl ooding, and they accept this living condition 
(…) we’re poor so we have to enjoy this, if we don’t want to experience 
this, we will have to wait until we are rich”. (Interview Nr.49, UNDIP 
29.07.2015) 
Interestingly, 85 percent of all households interviewed see the environment as 
a major risk (compared to 25 percent mentioning disputes, confl icts and crime, and 
7 percent mentioning their health). 40 percent have experienced fl oods (including 
tidal fl oods), and about 20 percent suffered damage to their houses. However, most 
respondents foresaw no threat of environmental change to their households in the 
coming year.
Migration patterns mainly cover adjacent rural areas, with only under 2 percent 
of the Semarang population having lived outside Central Java within the past fi ve 
years. Next to long-term migration to Semarang city from nearby regencies such as 
Grobogan, Demak, Kendal, there is signifi cant lifetime migration from other urban 
centres in Central Java, e.g. Surakarta and Salatiga. The recent migrants to Sema-
Fig. 4: The difference between the heightened house and the “sinking” house 
is evident, the community road has been renewed
Source: Morodemak in Demak, neighboring Semarang, photo by F. Hillmann
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rang city are mainly young and single people, most of whom fi nd employment in 
the service industry (80 percent) and manufacturing (19 percent), the latter mostly 
women (BPS 2012).
Our survey confi rms this pattern: the usual origin of the in-migrants was Java, 
which was also the most common destination of the out-migrants. Recent migrants 
in Kabupaten Semarang are mainly employed in manufacturing, young women of-
ten work in the textile industries. Semarang has lower wages then Jakarta, which 
has brought manufacturing to the town. Living conditions in the neighbouring rural 
areas are harsh and do not guarantee a stable income. This is what a fi sherman had 
to say about his motivation to move away from Morodemak, an eastern fi shing vil-
lage: 
“The difference here [compared to the city] is that people just work in the 
sea. So if we can’t go fi shing [because of extreme weather events], we 
get no money. In the city it is different. You can go every day to work and 
get money every day. That’s why people from here migrate. The work in 
the sea is hard! With rain, wind and waves”. (Gerstenberg 2015: 64)
One important aspect of migration trajectories are the narratives on migration. 
In Semarang, the perceptions of migration by the respondents are rather ambigu-
ous: 49 percent perceived migration as negative and stated that “you should never 
leave your place of origin.” Less than a half of our sample, 45 percent, see no further 
benefi ts for the household in the migration of household members. This hints to the 
fact that the migration of one household member is not seen as a major strategy 
to improve the situation of the entire household. However, 60 percent agreed that 
migration brings benefi ts for the community. Our data clearly shows respondents 
prefer domestic migration to leaving the country, with 68 percent of respondents 
answering that it would be “better to migrate within Indonesia than to go abroad.” 
In our sample from Kota Semarang, we found only a tiny share of international 
migrants – even though Semarang is an international and ethnically diverse city and 
a longstanding trading tradition. Only one-tenth of all households received remit-
tances: 1-20 Million IDR per year on average in 2015 (the average household income 
was 500.000 Ind per month13). In more than half of all cases, the out-migrants did 
not contribute to the household income or they only contributed on a monthly ba-
sis. Telephone and SMS (texting) are the main tools of communication, email and 
Skype are uncommon, and social media such as Facebook are used only sparsely. 
The perception of migration was fairly negative: again, 49 percent of our sample 
agreed with the statement that „you should never leave your place of origin.“ About 
half of the households in our sample did not think a household benefi ts from mi-
grated family members. On the contrary, 52 percent believed that migration causes 
inequality and confl ict within the community.
13 1 million Indonesian Rupiah equal to around 65 € (March 2016).
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So, considering that the living conditions in rural areas tend to deteriorate and 
given that the city still offers a range of opportunities, Semarang remains attractive 
for in-migrants, despite its environmental challenges. 
5 Conclusion
Two of the current contentious issues among academics, policymakers and the 
general public are climate change and the related trends in migration. Jointly, the 
two phenomena have led to heated debates and produced alarmist images of large 
population displacements due to natural disasters and severe environmental deg-
radation. However, causality is not straightforward and the meagre evidence is still 
rather mixed as to how climate change infl uences human mobility. Thus, as we 
argue that the multi-dimensional character of migration must be acknowledged and 
that more in-depth analysis must consider other, perhaps more important, drivers 
of migration; including socio-cultural aspects, economic development, and histori-
cal migration patterns as well as related narratives and belief systems. Research on 
these linkages would benefi t from analysis employing a regional focus which takes 
into account the specifi cities of regionally rooted socio-economic confi gurations, 
demographic developments, livelihoods, and governance structures.
Focusing on two coastal regions in Ghana and Indonesia which the IPCC consid-
ers highly vulnerable to climate change impacts and the ensuing population mobil-
ity, our contribution serves to illustrate the regional embeddedness of migration 
patterns, but also that changes in local climate and environment – although signifi -
cant – do not necessarily cause large scale and international migration. 
Although our two case studies are from very different regions, they do show 
some commonalities in terms of environmental problems, human mobility, and his-
torical development patterns. In both regions, anthropogenic environmental prob-
lems are prominent and a result of unsustainable economic development policies, 
such as the destruction of mangroves in favour of setting up fi shponds, large scale 
infrastructural and industrial development along the coast, deforestation, and the 
building of hydro-electric power plants in the hinterland. Longstanding technical ad-
aptation measures such as drainage systems (Semarang), the construction of wave 
breakers and moles (Keta and Semarang), and even dams (Keta) have changed the 
sedimentary structure and make it diffi cult to differentiate between man-made and 
“natural” environmental change today. In the case of Semarang, rapid urbanisation 
is the main driver for land subsidence and consequently the sinking of houses.
Despite severe environmental problems, the two case studies clearly show di-
verse migration patterns, both to and from the region. These mobility patterns are 
mainly driven by economic opportunities and educational possibilities, rather than 
by climate change. Semarang and Keta were prominent port cities in the past, but 
have seen their economic position decline as other major coastal cities emerge 
(Tema in Ghana; Jakarta and Surabaya on Java), partly due to their countries’ devel-
opment policies. Mobility in both case study regions is mainly within-country and 
largely to and from adjacent regions. Whereas Keta in Ghana has out-migration, 
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fuelled by local environmental degradation, economic decline, and rapid economic 
development along the Accra-Tema corridor in Ghana, it also attracts some migrants 
from Volta and adjacent regions, for reasons of trade and education. International 
migration fl ows are relatively small, but include some traditional mobility along the 
coast by local Ewe fi shermen and –women, traders from Ghana and neighbouring 
Togo, and outbound and return migration by higher educated workers venturing to 
Europe, the USA, and other developed countries. Furthermore, narratives such as 
the Anlo-Ewe migration saga are part of local traditions and are kept alive through 
festivals and an active diaspora through the sharing of local knowledge by chiefs- 
and sub-chiefs. Our survey shows a population that is inclined to migrate and that 
actively fosters a culture of migration. 
In comparison, Semarang city has attracted migrants for decades. The city re-
mains an important administrative centre, major transportation hub, industrial and 
manufacturing centre, and boasts vital educational and health facilities and other 
public services. Thus, Semarang attracts many migrants, the bulk of whom come 
from adjacent rural areas seeking employment in local industry and the informal 
sector. International migration from Semarang is limited. The population in the 
fl ood-prone coastal areas is stable and adapts with in situ solutions such as the 
heightening of houses. Most respondents did not perceive migration as a privileged 
way of adaptation, but rather stressed that “attachment to place” is a virtue. Living 
conditions in the neighbouring districts such as Demak were even harsher than in 
the city and put additional pressure on the resident population. 
As for detrimental environmental change and its impact on migration, the case 
studies show that migration patterns nowadays appear to be path-dependent and 
thus tend to be stable over time. Also, increasing education opportunities and eco-
nomic growth, as well as urbanisation, seem to impact migration more than ongoing 
environmental change does. Concatenated crises, a cumulation of diverse shocks 
and disturbances, (Biggs et al. 2011) seem to be at core of the new mobility patterns. 
Climate change was addressed by policy-makers in both cases and became part of 
the cultural narrative, but was in fact not seen as a major threat by the local popula-
tion. In Semarang, although some movement away from the low-lying coastal areas 
prone to land subsidence and fl ooding is underway, a large proportion of the popu-
lation adapts to these environmental threats and continues seeking a livelihood in 
situ. The case of Semarang shows that vulnerability exists precisely because of the 
immobility of the resident population. Many are poor and cannot afford to leave, as 
they lack resources and seek job security with the local employment opportunities.
Both local governmental development policies and environmental policies are 
rather technical, emphasizing large scale coastal protection measures, and both 
sustain the sedentarism of local populations. 
We conclude that although the environmental phenomena in question – fl ooding 
and erosion – may seem similar, they can have very different effects on population 
mobility as is evident from the contrasting case studies presented here. Only an 
analysis rooted in the regional setting allows for the identifi cation of socio-eco-
nomic, cultural, environmental and historical legacies that determine migration and 
population dynamics. Further, argumentation that refers on assumptions that are 
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based on global data and trends, will remain blind for what can be done to ease the 
situation for the many people that are confronted with a changing environment on 
the local level. Population movements occur mostly on the regional scale and thus 
the needed innovative approaches to tackle the situation are likely to be of integra-
tive nature – combining social, economic, ecological and migration-related action. 
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